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Cert to CA7 (Pell, Coffey, 
Weigel (DJ)) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends CA7 erred in holding that a 
trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy does not have power to 
"";' ; ' . . 
waive the debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege with 
... ' . ' ' 





2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petr in October 1980 
filed a complaint against Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers 
(CDCB) alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 
U.S.C. 1 et seq. The parties entered into a consent decree pro-
viding for a freeze on CDCB's assets and appointment of a receiv-
er. The receiver in November 1980 filed a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Petr initiated a formal investiga-
-----·· ·----~---~
tion and in January i981 issued a subpoena to CDCB's former coun-
sel, resp Weintraub, seeking testimony regarding alleged fraudu-
lent activities and misappropriation of funds by CDCB's officers 
and employees. Resp Weintraub appeared for the deposition but -refused to answer certain questions on the basis of CDCB's 
attorney-client privilege. The trustee waived the privilege with 
respect to any communications occurring before the filing of the 
petition for bankruptcy. Resp Frank McGhee is president of CDCB, 
and resp Andrew McGhee is a former officer and director: both of 
them were targets of investigation by petr, and Frank McGhee was 
convicted of embezzling funds customers had placed with CDCB. 
The McGhees intervened in the proceedings before the district 
court and opposed the waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 
The district court subsequently ordered resp Weintraub to answer 
the deposition questions without asserting CDCB's privilege. - -----------
I/'CA7 reversed and held that a bankruptcy trustee does not 
-···~-have power to waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privi-
1~ with respect to communications that occurred before filing 
for bankruptcy. ~ other CAs, the court acknowledged, have 
reached the opposite conclusion. See In Re O.P.M. Leasing Serv-- ------· 
- 3 -
ices, Inc., 670 F.2d 383, 385 ~ 1982); Citibank v. Andros, 666 
F.2d 1192 V{'(Aa 1982). CA7 distinguished O.P.M. Leasing, which 
involved a reorganization under Chapter 11, on the that there the 
board of directors had resigned and the power to waive the privi-
lege adhered to the trustee because there was no other entity 
authorized to so act. Petn App. 7a. In this case, Frank McGhee 
remained a corporate officer of CDCB and opposed the waiver of 
the corporation's attorney-client privilege. Citibank v. Andros, 
however, was not distinguishable on this grounds and CA7 refused 
to follow CAB's conclusion for four reasons. First, although the 
trustee holds broad management powers for the debtor, he does not 
replace the corporation as an entity. Second, allowing the 
trustee to waive the corporation's privilege would create unequal 
treatment between bankrupt corporations and bankrupt individuals. 
Third, allowing such waiver would discriminate against the corpo-
rate debtor solely on the basis of economic status. Finally, and 
in CA7's view, most importantly, allowing the trustee to waive 
the privilege would have a potential chilling effect on attorney-
client communications. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues cert is appropriate be-
I 
cause there is a split in the circuits. See also In re Boileau, -736 F.2d 503 (CA9 1984) (examiner with power of trustee had pow-
er, under the circumstances, to waive debtor's privilege). Sec-
ond, as a matter of corporations and bankruptcy law, CA7 is wrong 
on the merits. Because the liquidation trustee is granted, in 
essence, complete management authority, he is the proper party to 
waive or assert the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege. 
- 4 -
This result, as the facts here suggest, desirably prevents former 
directors and officers from abusing the corporation's privilege 
to shield their own wrongdoing. CA7's holding raises potential 
conflicts-of-interest problems where a bankrupt corporation may 
have causes of action against its officers or directors. 
Petr also argues that CA7's policy arguments are misplaced. 
Any chilling effect from allowing the trustee to waive the privi-
lege is no greater than that resulting from the possibility that 
successor management of a solvent corporation might make a simi-
lar waiver. Corporations, as artificial entities, are not enti-
tled to be treated the same as bankrupt individuals, and there is 
no discrimination between bankrupt and solvent corporations be-
cause in both cases "management" may waive the privilege. Final-
ly, petr observes that CA7's decision will seriously interfere 
with the government's ability to enforce criminal, commodity, and 
securities laws. 
Resp maintains that the Bankruptcy Code does not resolve 
this issue and Congress, not the Court, should determine who may 
waive the privilege on behalf of the bankrupt corporation. The 
decision by CA2 is distinguishable and CAB's decision is wrong on 
the merits. Resp also repeats the arguments made by CA7. 
In an amicus brief supporting petr, the trustee notes that 
CA7's decision interferes with his ability to bring civil actions 
against CDCB's officers and undesirably allows dishonest m?nage-
ment to protect itself from personal liability to the estate. 
4. ~ISCUSSION: Citibank v. Andros involved the former 
Bankruptcy Act rather than the current Bankruptcy Code. Nonethe-
- 5 -
less, CAS spoke in general terms about the trustee's power to 
~----------------~'--
...., 
waive the attorney client privilege and nothing in its opinion 
suggests that it would reach a different conclusion under the 
Code. Thus, I think the SG is right to argue that there is a -----
split in the circuits. Moreover, it seems incredible that an 
officer could assert a bankrupt corporation's attorney-client 
privilege in defending himself against an action brought by the 
trustee on behalf of the 'state. Th;:;G and the trustee persua-
sively argue that CA7' s approach will have harmful consequences 
both for government investigations and for the trustee's exercise ---------
of his duties under the Ban~£UEtcy Code. Resp's contention that 
--------·----------the issue should be left to Congress is unconvincing inasmuch as 
the Rules of Evidence explictly contemplate that the courts will 
define the "common law" of witness privileges. See Fed. R. Evid. 
501. A GRANT seems appropriate unless the Court wishes to wait 
for the views of other CAs on this issue. 
There is a response. 
October 15, 1984 Bales opn in petn 
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SUMMARY BENCH MEMORANDUM 
~C/47 
To: Mr. Justice Powell March 3, 1985 
From: Lee 
No. 84-261, Commodity Futures Trading Comm•n v. Weintraub 
(~,_,A<) 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Does the trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy 
have the power to waive the debtor corporation's attorney-
client privilege? 
BACKGROUND 
Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB) is a 
commodity brokerage house registered with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm•n (Comm'n). On October 27, 1980, the 
., 
2. 
Comm'n filed a complaint in DC against CDCB alleging 
various violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. 7 u.s.c. 
§1 et seq. Frank McGhee, the sole director and officer of 
CDCB, entered into a consent decree with the Comm'n 
providing for the appointment of a receiver. About one 
week later, the receiver filed a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy seeking 1 iquida tion under Chapter 7, 11 U.S .c. 
§761 et seq. 1 The receiver, John Notz, was made trustee of 
the debtor corporation's estate. 
Ewen after the bankruptcy petition was filed, the 
Comm'n continued its investigation of CDCB. On January 28, 
1981, the Comm'n served an investigatory subpoena on CDCB's 
former counsel, Gary Weintraub. The Comm'n sought 
testimony about suspected fraudulent activities by CDCB' s 
officers and employees. Weintraub appeared for the 
deposition and responded to almost 800 questions. 
Weintraub refused to answer 23 questions, however, on the 
ground that to do so would violate CDCB's attorney-client 
privilege. The questions that Weintraub refused to answer 
concerned location of corporate funds, the identity of the 
persons who deposited corporate funds in Weintraub's 
personal trading account, the amount of customer equity, 
personal loans made to coroprate officers, and the 
corporation's policies about access to the corporate safe. 
1chapter 7 is the only bankruptcy avenue available to a 
commodity broker. 11 u.s.c. '§109(d). 
3. 
On December 15, 1981, the Comm'n filed this action 
in the DC for the N.D. Ill. to compel Weintraub to answer 
the questions as to which he had asserted CDCB's privilege. 
After determining that waiver of the privilege would be in 
the best interests of CDCB's estate, the trustee in 
bankruptcy waived the corporation's attorney-client 
privilege. On Apr~l 26, 1982, a magistrate granted the 
Commission's application for an order comnpelling Weintraub 
to answer the 23 questions. The magistrate found that the 
trustee had validly waived CDCB's privilege. 
2 
&firmed the magistrate's order. 
The DC 
CA7 reversed the judgment of the DC. It held that 
a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive a 
corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege. The court of 
appeals gave three reasons for its holding: ( 1) permitting 
the trustee of a corporate debtor to waive the privilege 
would treat such debtors less favorably than individuals in 
bankruptcy; ( 2) permitting the bankruptcy trustee to waive 
the privilege would discriminate against corporations on 
the basis of economic status; and (3) allowing waivers by 
trustees would chill attorney-client communications. The 
CA recognized that its decision conflicted with Citibank, 
N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (CA8 1981) • 3 
2Although the action was brought against Weintraub, Frank 
McGhee and Andrew McGhee, a former director and officer of CDCB, 
were granted leave to intervene as defendants. 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
.. 
4. 
This Court granted a writ of certiorari in order 
to resolve the split in the circuits. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Section 542(e) of the Bankruptcy Code 
Section 542(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
Subject to any applicable privilege, after notice 
and a hearing, the court may order an attorney, 
accountant, or other person that holds recorded 
information, including books, documents, records, 
and papers, relating to the debtor's property or 
financial affairs, to disclose such recorded 
information to the trustee. 
11 u.s. c. §542(e) (emphasis added). The respondents 
contend that this statutory provision was intended to 
prevent trustees in bankruptcy from obtaining information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. According to 
respondents, if trustees are given the power to waive the 
corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege, 
thisCongressional intent will be frustrated. A look at the 
legislative history of §542(e) reveals that respondents' 
argument is meritless. 
Section 542(e) was designed to limit the ability 
3cA7 distinguished this case from In re O.P.M. Leasing 
Services, Inc., 670 F.2d 383 (1982), in which CA2 held that the 
trustee in bankruptcy could not waive the corporate debtor's 
privilege. In O.P.M. Leasing, the critical fact was that the 
corporate debtor had no board of directors. Under these 
circumstances, the power to exercise the corporation's privilege 
"adheres to the trustee by virtue of the nonexistence of any 
other entity authorized to so act." Here, of course, Frank 
McGhee continued as a director and officer even after the 
bankruptcy petition was filed. 
5. 
of attorneys and others to withhold relevant information. 
4 Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 542.06, at 542-21. It was 
intended to preventlawyers and accountants from using state 
law liens to obtain payment ahead of other creditors by 
withholding documents necessary to the administration of 
the estate. S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess, 84, 
reprinted in 1978 u.s. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5870; 
H.R. Rep No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 369-70, reprinted 
in 1978 u.s. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6325-26. There is 
nothing to suggest that Congress, in expanding the 
trustee's investigatory powers, intended to resolve 
questions as to the application of the attorney-client 
privilege. In fact, during the floor debates, proponents 
of the measure stated that "the extent to which the 
attorney-client privilege is valid against the trustee is 
unclear ••• and is left to be determined by the courts on a 
case by case basis." 124 Cong. Rec. 33, 999 (statement of 
Sen. DeConcini); 124 Cong. Rec. 32,400 (statement of Rep. 
Edwards) • Therefore, in deciding whether a trustee may 
waive the attorney-client privilege, one must look beyond 
the Bankruptcy Code for an answer. 
II. Trustee as Manager Theory 
Ordinarily, the power to waive a corporation's 
attorney-client privilege rest with its management (i.e., 
the board of directors). When control of a corporation 
passes to new management, control of the attorney-client 
privilege passes as well. Therefore, when new management 
6. 
is installed as a result of a takeover, merger, change in 
shareholder composition, or other business development, the 
new managers may waive the attorney-client privilege with 
respect to communications made by former officers and 
directors. See, ~, United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 
700, 704 (8th Cir. 1971); cert. denied, 405 u.s. 932 
(1972) 0 
The SG contends that because the trustee in 
bankruptcy "manages" the debtor corporation, he should be 
allowed to waive its attorney-client privilege. The 
respondents agree that the "manager" of a corporation may 
waive the attorney-client privilege, but deny that the 
trustee fills this role. Therefore, the primary dispute in 
this case relates to the powers and duties of the trustee 
in bankruptcy. Because it appears that the trustee is in 
relevant respects indistinguishable 
manager, he should be allowed 
from a non-bankruptcy 
to waive a debtor 
corporation's attorney-client privilege. 
The powers of management, as defined by state law 
and most corporate charters, are extensive. It has 
complete control over the day-to-day operations of the 
corporation. See, ~, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §14l(a) 
(1983). It controls any litigation involving the 
corporation. Moreover, management is given authority to 
make many decisions outside the ordinary course of 
business, such as retiring shares of the corporation's 
stock. See, ~, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §243(a) (1983). 
..... 
7. 
Along with this extensive grant of power, directors are 
under certain fiduciary duties, the most important of which 
is the duty to maximize the corporation's profits for the 
benefit of its shareholders. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W.2d 668, 684 (1919). 
The powers of the trustee in bankruptcy are 
strikingly similar to those of the corporation's 
management. The Code gives the trustee the authority to 
oversee all of the debtor's operations within "the ordinary 
course of business." See 11 u.s.c. §363(c) (1). Perhaps 
most relevant to the determination of who controls the 
attorney-client privilege is the trustee's power to 
commence litigation on behalf of the estate and to dictate 
the course of litigation pending at the time the bankruptcy 
petition is filed. See Bankr. R. 6009; 11 u.s.c. §323(b). 
The trustee may even terminate suits in which the expected 
return to the estate is less than the expected cost of 
litigation. See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ~323.02. 
The respondents contend that the "most glaring 
differenc[e] between bankruptcy trustees and nonbankruptcy 
management [is] whom they represent." There may be a 
distinction between the categories of investors to whom the 
directors and the trustee owe their primary duties. The 
fiduciary duties of corporate directors run to 
shareholders, not creditors. But see Superintendent of 
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 u.s. 6, 12 
(1971). The bankruptcy trustee, on the other hand, is most 
B. 
concerned about the creditors' rights. This distinction, 
however, is one of terminology rather than substance. The 
trustee has a duty to maximize the estate's assets. 
Nonbankrupcy management pursues this same goal when it 
attempts to maximize the return to the residual claimants 
of the enterprise, the shareholders. See Waiver of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege by a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 31 
Chi. L. Rev. , _ (1985) (forthcoming). 4 
Because they have the same powers and duties as 
nonbankruptcy management, trustees should be allowed to 
waive the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege. 
This holding will prevent corporate directors from filing 
for bankruptcy soley to avoid losing control of the 
company's attorney-client privilege. Cf. Butner v. United 
States, 440 u.s. 48 (1979) ("uniform treatment of property 
interests serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage 
forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a 
windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of 
bankruptcy. '") Moreover, giving the trustee the power to 
4There is another difference between corporate management and 
the trustee in bankruptcy. The Code requires that the trustee 
obtain court approval for the use, sale, or lease of estate 
property outside of the ordinary course of the debtor's business. 
11 u.s.c. §363(b) (1). Corporate directors, of course, need not 
obtain such approval. This distinction, however, does not 
justify treating the trustee as something other than new 
management of the corporation. The trustee's actions are more 
closely scrutinized because after the bankruptcy petition is 





waive the privilege will aid him in uncovering causes of 
action against the debtor's officers and directors. 
Particularly where the bankruptcy is precipitated by 
insider misconduct, such causes of action are important 
assets of the estate. See generally 11 u.s.c. §704(4), 
547, 548. If former management controlled the attorney-
client privilege, they might assert the privilege so as to 
impede the recovery of assets that were wrongfully diverted 
or appropriated. See Securities and Exchange Commission 
Report on the Study and Investigation of the work, 
Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and 
Reorganization Committees, Pt. VIII, 109-110 (1938) 5 
III. Arguments Against Giving the Trustee the Power to 
Waive the Privilege 
CA7 made three primary arguments in support of its 
holding. They will be considered in order. 
CA7 first asserted that allowing the trustee in 
bankruptcy to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege 
would discriminate among corporations on the basis of 
economic status. Solvent corporations would be allowed to 
assert or waive their rivileges by action of their elected 
5There certainly would be a conflict of interest in this case 
if corporate management, rather than the trustee, controlled the 
attorney-client privilege. Frank McGhee, the sole director and 
officer, was convicted in 1983 of embezzling $3.5 million in 
customer funds, in violation of Section 9(a) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 7 u.s.c. 13(a), and was sentenced to three years in 
prison. 
- .. ,,,... 
10. 
officers while insolvent corporationis would be forced to 
bend to the will of the trustee. Implicit in this argument 
is the assumption that the trustee will exercise the 
debtor's attorney-client privilege to the detriment of the 
corporation, while the debtor's directors will not. This 
assumption, of course, ignores the duties placed upon the 
trustee. Because the trustee's duties are aligned with the 
interests of a corporate debtor's residual claimants, no 
"discrimination" against insolvent corporations would 
result from a rule that gives the trustee control over the 
attorney-client privilege. 
CA7 further found that a trustee in bankruptcy 
should not be allowed to waive a corporate debtor's 
attorney-client privilege because it would be "absurd" to 
permit a trustee to waive an individual's privilege. The 
problem with this rationale is that it assumes that 
individual 
----- '--- --~ -... when are reasons applying 
different rules in each case. Unlike an individual, a 
corporation is an artificial entity that can act only 
through its agents. The directors' control of a 
corporation's privilege rests solely on their relationship 
to the corporation. On the other hand, when an individual 
asserts his attorney-client privilege, he is asserting a 
privilege that is personal to him. Because directors who 
try to assert the corporation's attorney-client privilege 
occupy a different position vis-a-vis the holder of the 
11. 
privilege than does the indivrdual asserting his own 
privilege, it might make a great deal of sense to treat 
corporate directors and individuals differently. 
Finally, CA7 found that allowing the trustee to 
waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege would 
have a chilling effect on communications between corporate 
agents and attorneys. This argument, however, loses sight 
of the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the 
corporate context. The decision as to whether a 
corporation's privilege will be waived is left solely to 
its current management; the former directors cannot prevent 
the disclosure of information that was given to the 
corporation's counsel during their directorships. This 
rule certainly makes management reluctant to disclose to 
lawyers information that is personally incriminating. But 
it seems unlikely that allowing trustees in bankruptcy to 
waive the attorney-client privilege will add much to this 
existing disincentive to full disclosure. In sum, the 
chilling effect emphasized by CA7 is the result of the 
nonbankruptcy rule that that allows only the current agents 
of the corporation to waive the privilege. 6 
RECOMMENDATION 
6An alternative argument advanced by the SG is that the 
attoney-client privilege passes to the trustee as property of the 
estate. This argument is not too persuasive, however, for the 
right to waive the attorney-client privilege cannot be bought, 
sold, or levied upon by creditors. 
•'' 
12. 
The judgment of CA7 should be reversed. The 
trustee in bankruptcy, because he manages the debtor 
corporation, should be allowed to waive its attorney-client 
privilege. 
.. 
March 4, 1985 
COMMOD GINA-POW 
MEMO TO FILE 
84-261 · Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub 
This case involves the bankruptcy of Chicago Discount 
Commodity Brokers, a corporation subject to the provisions 
of the Commodity Exchange Act and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission. The specific question in the case 
arises out of an investigation by the Commission to 
determine whether the bankrupt corporation engaged in 
certain fraudulent acts. 
The bankruptcy proceedings contemplates the 
liquidation under Subchapter IV of Chapter VII of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and John K. Notz was appointed trustee of 
the bankrupt estate. 
The Commission served an investigatory subpena on 
respondent, Gary Weintruab, former counsel to the bankrupt 
corporation. The Commission desired respondent's 
testimony about matters including the suspected fradulent 
activities. Respondent Weintraub appeared folr a 
deposition and responded to some 800 questions, but 
refused to answer 23 questions on the basis that he could 
rely on "attorney-client privilege". In other words, as I 
. .. 
2. 
understand it, the bankrupt corporation - prior to the 
bankruptcy - and Weintraub were in the relationship of 
client and attorney so that the corporation could claim 
the privilege with respect to confidential matters with 
its attorney. 
The question presented by the case before us, as 
stated in the petition for cert, is as follows: 
"Whether the trustee of a corporation in 
bankruptcy has the power to assert or waive the 
debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege 
with respect to communications that took place 
before the petition in bankruptcy was filed." 
It is apparently well-settled that the corporation 
itself could have asserted the privilege or elected to 
waive it. Moreover, the SG argues, apparently with 
considerable authority to support his position, that the 
management of a corporation - its board of directors - has 
the authority to assert or waive the corporate privilege, 
and that even officers individually ~o such authority 
where the lawyer had been acting as counsel for the 
corporation itself. 
The District Court held that the trustee in 
bankruptcy took the place of the corporate management and 
had the authority to waive the privilege. The Court of 
;. 
3. 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, took a different view, 
and held "that the trustee in bankruptcy of a corporate 
debtor does not have the power to waive the corporation's 
attorney-client privilege as to any communication occuring 
or arising on or before the date the petition in 
bankruptcy was filed." This decision of CA7 conflicts 
with a decision of CA8 on the same issue, and presumably 
we granted the case to resolve the conflict. 
The Court of Appeals here found nothing in the 
Bankruptcy Code that authorizes the trustee to waive or 
assert the privilege. The trustee under the Code does not 
replace the corporation, and to permit waiver by the 
trustee would in effect discriminate against bankrupt 
corporations as compared to solvent corporations. 
Presumably, in this case, in the absence of the bankruptcy 
the corporation itself in a fraud investigation could have 
claimed the privilege. The Court of Appeals therefore 
seems to have a good point in saying that the trustee who 
was not a party to the transactions in which the attorney-
client r~lationship existed, had no right to give a waiver 
that the corporation itself absent the bankruptcy -
would have been unwilling to give. 
4. 
The government's argument is based primarily on a 
"management" theory: that is, the trustee in bankruptcy 
takes title to the property of the debtor, and makes the 
decisions that management would have made if it had 
continued in control of the business. One of the 
decisions is whether or not to assert or waive the 
attorney-client privilege. 
This is not an area of the law in which I have any 
expertise or any great interest. I am inclined - very 
tentatively - to think that CA7 has the better reasoning 
at least theoretically. On the other hand, as a practical 
matter, a good deal of fraud could be covered up if the 
trustee of a bankrupt corporation lacked authority to 
waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to 
confidential matters that had occurred prior to the 
bankruptcy. 
The SG's brief cites In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, 
Inc., 670 F.2d 383, CA2 (1982) as holding that the trustee 
of a corporation 
Chapter XI of 
undergoing reorganization pursuant 
the Bankruptcy Code could waive 
to 
the 
corporation's attorney-client privilege. I have not 
looked at CA2's opinion. I would like a brief, summary 
memo from my clerk. As presently disposed, I would not 
'•.oill• 
5. 
dissent from an opinion affirming or reversing CA7. The 
issue is hardly one of national importance. We need to 
resolve the conflict. 
LFP, JR. 
< .. . 
,. 
84-261 rommoditv FuturPs v. Weintraub 
Dea! Thurqoo~: 
Pleaqe a~~ ~t t~e en~ o~ the next draft of vo~r 
opinion that I took no part in the conAfder~tinn or ~ecision 
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